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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
CORY M. DAVISON, : Case No. 920591-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992 Repl. Vol.). 
STATUTES, RULES. AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
See Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the prosecutor's closing argument violate appellant's 
right to due process of law? 
Standard of review. In assessing the prosecutor's 
questions and argument, this Court will make an original 
determination of whether the prosecutor brought improper 
information to the jury's attention, and whether such information 
probably influenced the jurors. State v. Troy. 688 P.2d 483, 486 
(Utah 1984) . If this Court views the evidence of guilt to be 
ambiguous or in conflict with other evidence, this Court will "more 
closely scrutinize the conduct." Id. It is the State's burden to 
show that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See 
State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368, 1373 and n. 21 (Utah 1986). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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2. Did the prosecutor's misconduct constitute plain error so 
as to obviate the need for an objection below? 
Standard of review. 
When objections are not made at trial and properly 
preserved, appellate review is under a "plain error" 
standard. Plain errors are those that "should have been 
obvious to the trial court and that affect the 
substantial rights of the accused." 
State v. Ellifritz. 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting 
State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 1207, 1210-11 (Utah App. 1991). 
3. Does Utah law require counsel to object to a prosecutor's 
closing argument even where the objection would only serve to 
exaggerate the harm? 
Standard of review. This is a legal question and should 
be determined by the court without deference to the trial court. 
Maxwell v. Maxwell, 796 P.2d 403, 404 (Utah App. 1990); Olwell v. 
Clark, 658 P.2d 585, 586 n. 1 (Utah 1982). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
i 
On July 8, 1991 appellant Cory M. Davison was charged in 
an information with unlawfully offering and agreeing to sell a 
class II controlled substance, cocaine, to an undercover narcotics 
officer on May 21, 1990, over one year earlier. 
A jury trial was held before Judge Leslie A. Lewis. In 
his closing argument, prosecutor Ernie Jones improperly 
mischaracterized the evidence, implied that Davison should be 
convicted in part because some of his family and acquaintances are 
drug dealers, and implied that Mr. Davison had an obligation to > 
2 
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show who actually did commit the crime he was charged with (in 
effect improperly shifting the burden of proof from the State to 
the defendant). After three hours forty five minutes of 
deliberation the jury returned a verdict of guilty. 
Appellant was sentenced to one to fifteen years in 
prison, stayed pending satisfactory completion of three years 
parole. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 8, 1991 appellant Cory M. Davison was charged in 
an information with unlawfully selling cocaine to an undercover 
narcotics officer on May 21, 1990. R. 6-7. 
A jury trial was held before Judge Leslie A. Lewis. R. 
150-408. The only real issue at trial was identification, on which 
the evidence was conflicting. Officer Lucas testified that at the 
time of the sale he had been undercover for about two months, R. 
250:9-11, had made approximately 100 drug buys from 25 to 100 
people, and had had contact with many more. R. 270:14-21. Prior 
to the sale he had never spoken with the suspect, but he had seen 
him five to six times. R. 256:7-13. Approximately two weeks later 
Lucas identified the suspect as Cory Davison from a photo obtained 
from Motor Vehicles. R. 262:3-263:12. No photo spread or lineup 
was conducted. R. 271:9-272:3. Lucas was unable to identify any 
of the other individuals located at the crime scene at the time of 
the crime. R. 277:18-20. Lucas testified that the suspect was 
wearing a red sweat suit with white athletic shoes. R. 259:23-
260:1. Mr. Davison and two other witnesses testified that he did 
3 
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not own or wear a red sweat suit or white athletic shoes at the 
time of the sale. R. 323:20-324:14 (Cory Davison); R. 298:19-
299:19 (Rosalie Allison); R. 312:25-313:15 (Tracy D. Davison). 
Cory Davison denied selling Lucas drugs. R. 324:23-325:1. 
In his closing argument, prosecutor Ernie Jones 
impermissibly created the impression that appellant had the burden 
of proving who actually sold cocaine to officer Lucas. Mr. Jones 
also mischaracterized the evidence, and implied that Cory should be 
convicted in part because several if not all of his relatives and 
acquaintances were drug dealers. Mr. Jones stated: 
Well, finally we heard from the defendant. We 
heard from Cory Davison. And he gave us an interesting 
approach to the case. He started off by trying to 
suggest to you that maybe the person who was involved in 
this transaction was Bobby Davison, because Bobby had 
used his name on other occasions. Didn't you find it 
interesting that he didn't bring Bobby into court so you 
could see what Bobby looked like? He just wanted you to 
think that maybe Bobby Davison was using his name. 
Well, what did we do in that response? We 
first of all, we introduced a photograph, that's Exhibit 
6, of Bobby Davison. These two men don't look alike at 
all. Bobby Davison doesn't look like Cory Davison in the 
least. 
But probably most important, is I put Officer 
Lucas back on the stand, and I said, "Officer Lucas, do 
you know Bobby Davison?" 
He said, "No, I've never met, I've never heard 
that name before." And then I showed him the photograph, 
and he said, "No, that's not the man that I purchased 
narcotics from. That's not the one who was involved in 
this transaction." 
But you see, Cory Davison, the defendant, 
wanted you somehow to believe through an inference or a 
suggestion that maybe there was somebody out there like 
Bobby Davison, who was using his name. But he doesn't 
bother to produce him. He just wants you to think that. 
There's no way that Bobby Davison was the one 
who was involved in the transaction. So we dispelled 
that. 
The next is, he starts throwing out a series of 
names to you about people who were living at the home, 
4 
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other people who maybe were involved in this transaction, 
and maybe that's where the officer was mistaken. 
One of the people he said, of course, was 
there, was Rudy Martin. Well, you saw Rudy Martin. Rudy 
Martin doesn't look anything like Cory Davison. And 
again, Officer Lucas testified, "Oh, I know Rudy Martin. 
I've bought drugs from Rudy Martin. But not on that day. 
Not on May 21st of 1990. That's not the person who was 
involved." 
Well, the defense says, "Well, what about Kim 
McCardell?" 
And again, I asked Officer Lucas, "Do you know 
Kim McCardell?" 
"Yes, I know him because I purchased narcotics 
from him. But he's not the person I bought from on May 
21st of 1990." 
Well, another name the defendant threw out was 
George Wilkerson. George Wilkerson, Officer Lucas again 
with the same answer, "I know George Wilkerson. That's 
not the person I bought from. George is much older than 
the defendant. Much older than the person I bought from 
on May 21st." 
Well, what about Lorenzo Davison? Again, 
Officer Lucas said, "I know Lorenzo. That's not the 
person I bought from. I bought from him before. He's 
twenty-six years old." 
And finally they finished up with, "Well, 
Raymond Davison was living there." Raymond Davison's 
thirty-seven years old. And again, Officer Lucas with 
the same response. He knew who he was. But that's not 
the person he bought from on that day. 
The one thing that was so interesting about all 
of the names that the defendant threw out to you is that 
all of them are drug dealers. Officer Lucas knew every 
one of them except Bobby Davison. And the reason he knew 
them? Because he'd purchased narcotics, he'd purchased 
cocaine, he'd purchased drugs from each and every one of 
those. But not on May 21st. Not on May 21st of 1990. 
R. 370:11-373:3 (emphasis added). Mr. Donaldson, counsel for 
defendant, did not object. 
After three hours forty five minutes of deliberation, the 
jury returned a verdict of guilty. R. 102. Appellant was 
sentenced to one to fifteen years in prison, stayed pending 
satisfactory completion of three years parole. R. 137-8. 
5 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The prosecutor's closing argument violated appellant's 
right to due process. The prosecutor: 
(a) attempted to shift the burden of proof to 
appellant by implying that appellant had a duty to 
produce the person who actually sold drugs to the 
undercover narcotics officer, 
(b) mischaracterized the facts in evidence, and 
(c) implied that appellant should be convicted in 
part because he is acquainted with known drug dealers. 
Although trial counsel did not object, the prosecutorial 
misconduct constitutes plain error and must be addressed by this 
Court. 
In the context of closing arguments, Utah should 
recognize an exception to the rule requiring a contemporaneous 
objection to preserve an issue for review. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING ARGUMENT VIOLATED 
APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. 
The Utah Supreme Court has established a two prong test 
for reversals for improper statements of counsel. State v. Valdez. 
513 P.2d 422 (Utah 1973); see also State v. Troy. 688 P.2d 483, 486 
(Utah 1984), State v. Johnson. 663 P.2d 48 (Utah 1983), overruled 
on other grounds in State v. Roberts. 711 P.2d 235, 239 (Utah 
6 
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1985), State v. Creviston. 646 P.2d 750 (Utah 1982), State v. 
Gaxiola, 550 P.2d 1298 (Utah 1976). 
The test of whether the remarks made by counsel are so 
objectionable as to merit a reversal in a criminal case 
is, did the remarks call to the attention of the jurors 
matters which they would not be justified in considering 
in determining their verdict, and were they, under the 
circumstances of the particular case, probably influenced 
by those remarks. 
Valdez, 513 P.2d at 426. 
If the conclusion of the jurors is based on their 
weighing conflicting evidence or evidence susceptible of 
differing interpretations, there is a greater likelihood 
that they will be improperly influenced through the 
remarks of counsel. Indeed, in such cases, the jurors 
may be searching for guidance in weighing and 
interpreting the evidence. They may be especially 
susceptible to influence, and a small degree of influence 
may be sufficient to affect the verdict. 
Troy, 688 P.2d at 486-87. 
A. THE PROSECUTOR'S REMARKS CALLED TO THE 
ATTENTION OF THE JURORS MATTERS WHICH THEY 
WOULD NOT BE JUSTIFIED IN CONSIDERING IN 
DETERMINING THEIR VERDICT. 
Mr. Jones improperly mischaracterized the law by implying 
that Cory Davison had an obligation to present evidence and prove 
who actually sold drugs to the undercover officer: 
But you see, Cory Davison, the defendant, 
wanted you somehow to believe through an inference or a 
suggestion that maybe there was somebody out there like 
Bobby Davison, who was using his name. But he doesn't 
bother to produce him. He just wants you to think that. 
R. 371:7-11. Mr. Davison certainly had no obligation to produce in 
court the person who actually sold drugs to Officer Lucas on May 
21, 1990. To the contrary, the burden was on the state to prove 
that Cory Davison was the person who sold drugs to Mr. Lucas on 
7 
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that date. Utah Code Ann. §76-1-501 (1990 Repl. Vol.); State v. 
Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466 (Utah App. 1988); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 
U.S. 510, 520, 99 S.Ct. 2450, , 61 L.Ed.2d 39, 48 (1979). 
The comments of Mr. Jones on the evidence directly 
contradicted the actual evidence elicited in this case. Jones 
mischaracterized Officer Lucas' testimony as being that he had 
bought drugs from Lorenzo Davison: 
Well, what about Lorenzo Davison? Again, Officer 
Lucas said, "I know Lorenzo. That's not the person I 
bought from. I bought from him before. He's twenty-six 
years old." 
R. 372:13-16. To the contrary, Lucas testified: 
Q (BY MR. JONES) Are you familiar with a Lorenzo 
Davison? 
A With the name only. 
Q Does he look anything at all like the 
defendant? 
MR. DONALDSON: Objection, he said he's only 
familiar with the name. No foundation. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q (BY MR. JONES) How do you know about Lorenzo 
Davison? 
A Just from hearing his name in the streets. 
R. 337:14-23. On cross examination, Lucas admitted he did not know 
Lorenzo Davison. R. 339:19-22. There is absolutely no testimony 
indicating that Lucas bought drugs from Lorenzo Davison, or that 
Lorenzo ever sold drugs to anyone. 
Deliberate misrepresentation of facts in a prosecutor's 
summation may rise to the level of a due process violation. United 
States v. Ruiz, 711 F.Supp. 145, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd 894 
F.2d 501 (2nd Cir. 1990). Given the evidence in this case and Mr. 
Jones' repeated misstatements of the evidence, Jones' argument 
appears to be more than a slip of the tongue. Jones refers to 
8 
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"every one of them except Bobby Davison" and comments that Lucas 
had "purchased drugs from each and every one of those." Jones 
specifically excepted Bobby Davison, but failed to except Lorenzo 
Davison and furthermore affirmatively asserts that Lorenzo did sell 
drugs to Lucas. Anthony Davison, referred to by appellant (R. 
322:11-23), is not mentioned by Jones, but Jones implies in no 
uncertain terms that he, too, would be included as someone who has 
sold narcotics to Lucas. 
Jones implied that appellant should be convicted because 
he is acquainted with known drug dealers. In his closing argument, 
Jones stated: 
The one thing that was so interesting about all 
of the names that the defendant threw out to you is that 
all of them are drug dealers. Officer Lucas knew every 
one of them except Bobby Davison. And the reason he knew 
them? Because he'd purchased narcotics, he'd purchased 
cocaine, he'd purchased drugs from each and every one of 
those. But not on May 21st. Not on May 21st of 1990. 
R. 372:22-373:3. Contrary to this mischaracterization, testimony 
of Officer Lucas fails to indicate: 
(a) that he knew Lorenzo Davison (R. 339:19-22; 337:14-21 
(indicating that Lucas knows of Lorenzo by name only)), 
(b) that he bought drugs from Lorenzo Davison (id.: no mention 
of buying from Lorenzo anywhere in record), 
(c) that he bought drugs from Bobby Davison (no mention of 
buying from Bobby anywhere in record), and 
(d) that he bought drugs from Anthony Davison (no mention of 
buying from Anthony anywhere in record). 
9 
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Mr. Jones7 misstatements are misleading and prejudicial. 
The prosecutor implies that every person defendant knows is a drug 
dealer, with the possible exception of Bobby Davison. The record 
does not indicate this to be the case. Furthermore, even if true 
this would be an improper basis on which to sustain a conviction. 
The relevance of any drug sales by acquaintances of Mr. Davison is 
limited to the issue of identification by Officer Lucas. To the 
extent Lucas knew these other individuals, it indicates that he did 
not buy from one of these individuals and then mistakenly identify 
someone else.1 To the extent the prosecution has used this 
evidence to indicate that Mr. Davison's family and acquaintances 
are criminals, it is unduly prejudicial and insufficiently 
probative to be of any value. Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Convictions should not be based on guilt by association. 
Cory Davison may only be convicted based on his acts, not based on 
his status of living near, being related to, or being acquainted 
with drug dealers. See Robinson v. California. 370 U.S. 660, 82 
S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1962) (criminal liability could not be 
premised on defendant's status of "being addicted to the use of 
narcotics"). 
^n fact, Lucas' familiarity with these other individuals is 
only relevant if it can be shown that he knew these other 
individuals at the time of the sale. The fact that Lucas later 
became acquainted with some of these other individuals does not 
tend to establish that he would have recognized them at an earlier 
date. With the exception of Rudy Martin, the record does not 
indicate that Lucas knew any of the individuals prior to the drug 
sale on May 21, 1990. 
10 
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Mr. Jones' closing argument drew the juror's attention to 
matters which should not have been considered in determining their 
verdict. In State v. Andreason. 718 P.2d 400, 402 (Utah 1986) the 
Utah Supreme Court reversed a conviction because of improper 
argument by the prosecutor: 
The jury's attention was clearly called to matters 
outside the evidence of the case# e.g., that defendant's 
alleged conduct was "pervasive/1 that others were 
involved in similar conduct, and that the jury needed to 
be concerned about those "who aren't innocent but are 
turned loose." What others did or did not do was not in 
evidence and was certainly not relevant to defendant's 
guilt or innocence. State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d at 51. 
Consequently, the jury was not justified in considering 
the statements. 
Similar conduct occurred here. The prevalence of drug dealers in 
appellant's neighborhood is not probative on the issue of his 
innocence or guilt, but serves only to prejudice the jury against 
him. Mr Davison's conviction should be reversed. 
B. THE JURY WAS PROBABLY INFLUENCED BY THE 
PROSECUTOR'S IMPROPER REMARKS. 
The evidence as to identification in this case was highly 
conflicting. Officer Lucas testified that he was sure of his 
identification, R. 256:1-3, but was unable to identify any of the 
other individuals located at the crime scene at the time of the 
crime. R. 277:18-20. Lucas testified that the suspect was wearing 
a red sweat suit with white athletic shoes. R. 259:23-260:1. Mr. 
Davison and two other witnesses testified that defendant did not 
own or wear a red sweat suit or white athletic shoes at the time of 
the sale. R. 323:20-324:14 (Cory Davison); R. 298:19-299:19 
(Rosalie Allison); R. 312:25-313:15 (Tracy D. Davison). 
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Given the conflicting nature of this evidence, it is more 
probable that the improper statements of Jones affected the 
verdict. Troy. 688 P.2d at 486-87; State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 
400, 402-03 (Utah 1986). The burden is on the state to show beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the prosecutor's misconduct was not 
prejudicial. State v. Tarafa. 720 P.2d 1368, 1373 and n. 21 (Utah 
1986) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 
828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-11, reh'q denied, 386 U.S. 987, 87 S.Ct. 
1283, 18 L.Ed.2d 241 (1967)); State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 204-
05 (Utah 1987) (constitutional harmless error standard rather than 
evidentiary abuse of discretion standard is applicable where a 
constitutional right is impinged). Since the jury deliberated for 
close to four hours before rendering its verdict, it cannot be said 
that the prosecutor's misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
POINT II. THE PROSECUTOR'S CONDUCT CONSTITUTES PLAIN 
ERROR. 
Litigants are precluded from asserting a claim on appeal 
for the first time unless the trial court committed plain error. 
State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1991). 
The first requirement for a finding of plain error is 
that the error be "plain," i.e., from our examination of 
the record, we must be able to say that it should have 
been obvious to a trial court that it was committing 
error. The second requirement for a finding of plain 
error is that the error affect the substantial rights of 
the accused, i.e., that the error be harmful. 
State v. Eldredcre, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 
814, 110 S.Ct. 62, 107 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989) (cites omitted). In 
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appropriate cases, the court may "dispense with the requirement of 
obviousness so that justice can be done, as when an error not 
readily apparent to the court or counsel proves harmful in 
retrospect." Id. at 35, n. 8. The prosecutor's conduct in this 
case should be reviewed on appeal under the plain error doctrine. 
A. THE PROSECUTOR'S MISCONDUCT WAS PLAIN. 
The prosecutor openly stated that appellant had failed to 
produce the person who actually sold drugs to officer Lucas. R. 
371:7-11. This statement is contrary to the established burden of 
proof in criminal cases. Utah Code Ann. §76-1-501 (1990 Repl. 
Vol.); State v. Sorenson. 758 P.2d 466 (Utah App. 1988); Sandstrom 
v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 520, 99 S.Ct. 2450, , 61 L.Ed.2d 39, 48 
(1979). The trial court should have recognized the impropriety of 
this statement and instructed the jury to disregard it entirely. 
In State v. Emmett, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (Utah April 7, 
1992) the prosecutor improperly commented on a prior forgery 
conviction and indicated that the defendant was prone to taking 
advantage of his family. The Utah Supreme Court held: 
This comment clearly urged the jury to view Emmett as a 
person who commits crimes against his family and to use 
this characteristic as evidence that Emmett sodomized his 
son. Therefore, the comments are in direct violation of 
rules 404 and 609. Given the clarity of the law in this 
area and the blatant nature of the prosecutor's 
statements, it should have been obvious to the trial 
court that the prosecutor's remarks called to the juror's 
attention matters they were not justified in considering. 
Id. at 35. The burden of proof in criminal matters is at least as 
fundamental as rules 404 and 609. See Utah Code Ann. §76-1-501 
13 
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(1990 Repl. Vol.). The prosecutor's misconduct in the instant case 
is at least as blatant as that in Emmett. 
Even if the court had made a curative instruction to the 
jury, there is a serious question as to whether appellant's due 
process rights were irreparably prejudiced. See State v. Peters, 
796 P.2d 708, 712 (Utah App. 1990) ("We have no delusion that a 
limiting instruction can undo serious prejudice"). Even if this 
court should find that the prosecutor's misconduct in this case was 
not plain, it should exercise its discretion and reach the merits 
because this conduct was very prejudicial and affected appellant's 
fundamental right to a fair trial. See Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 35 n. 
8. 
B. THE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT WAS HARMFUL. 
As addressed in Section I.B., supra at 11, the 
prosecutor's statements were harmful. The jury deliberated for 
nearly four hours on the simple question of identification before 
rendering a verdict of guilty. The United States Supreme Court has 
explicitly held that the reasonable doubt standard has 
constitutional ramifications: 
Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional 
stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly 
hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused 
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime 
with which he is charged. 
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 520, 99 S.Ct. 2450, , 61 
L.Ed.2d 39, 48 (1979) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 
S.Ct. 1068, , 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375 (1970)). 
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Mr. Jones' closing argument could well have had the 
effect of making the jury believe that appellant had some 
obligation to prove who actually sold drugs to Officer Lucas. This 
impermissibly shifts the burden of proof from the state to the 
defendant, in violation of Mr. Davison's right to due process. 
See Sandstrom v. Montana, supra. 
It is impossible to tell in this case if the jury's 
verdict was motivated by a legitimate lack of reasonable doubt or 
if it was tainted by the prosecutor's suggestion that appellant 
should have produced the actual criminal in court. Since the 
prosecutor cannot prove his comments were harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt, see Tarafa, 720 P.2d at 1373, appellant is 
entitled to a new trial. 
POINT III. DEFENSE COUNSEL SHOULD NOT BE COMPELLED TO 
OBJECT TO THE PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING ARGUMENT WHERE 
PREJUDICE CANNOT BE CURED OR OBJECTION WOULD ONLY 
SERVE TO EXAGGERATE THE HARM. 
Counsel for each side has considerable latitude in 
argument to the jury. State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 
1989); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 560 (Utah 1987); Gaxiola, 
550 P.2d at 1301; Valdez, 513 P.2d at 426. Given this latitude, 
the trial court is less likely to sustain objections except in the 
most egregious of cases.2 An objection by counsel is likely to 
exaggerate the harm done by the prosecutor's misconduct. While 
2See R. 393:7-18, where appellant's trial counsel properly 
objected to the prosecutor referring to the length of the 
transcript from the preliminary hearing, a fact that was not in 
evidence, and the trial court summarily overruled the objection. 
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this would serve to preserve an issue for appeal, it does not make 
sense for counsel to jeopardize his or her best chance for 
acquittal merely to preserve the right to appeal. If counsel is 
successful in obtaining an acquittal, then no appeal is necessary 
and judicial resources are saved by not necessitating an appeal and 
a new trial before an acquittal is obtained. 
In State v. Bullock. 791 P.2d 155 (Utah 1989), cert. 
denied, U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 3270, 111 L.Ed.2d 780 (1990), the 
Utah Supreme Court enunciated an exception to the plain error rule 
where counsel's failure to object was part of a conscious trial 
strategy.3 Bullock involved counsel's failure to object to the 
admissibility of evidence at trial. This case is distinguishable 
from Bullock in that it involves closing arguments rather than 
evidentiary matter in trial. Utah has not addressed this issue in 
the context of closing arguments of counsel, and a different rule 
should pertain. 
The danger of harm from prejudicial closing arguments is 
higher than for other aspects of the trial: 
If the conclusion of the jurors is based on their 
weighing conflicting evidence or evidence susceptible of 
differing interpretations, there is a greater likelihood 
that they will be improperly influenced through remarks < 
of counsel. Indeed, in such cases, the jurors may be 
searching for guidance in weighing and interpreting the 
evidence. They may be especially susceptible to 
influence, and a small degree of influence may be 
sufficient to affect the verdict. Counsel is obligated 
to avoid, as far as possible, any reference to those ^ 
matters the jury is not justified in considering. 3See also State v. Medina. 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987) 
(conscious failure to object to jury instruction waives review 
under manifest error provision of Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c)). 
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Troy. 688 P.2d at 486-87; accord Andreason. 718 P.2d at 403. 
Closing arguments are also closer in proximity to jury 
deliberations and therefore may be remembered more clearly. 
It has been recognized that objections may serve to 
exaggerate the harm sought to be avoided. See, e.g.. United States 
v. Berrv. 627 F.2d 193, 199 (1980), cert, denied. 449 U.S. 1113, 
101 S.Ct. 925, 66 L.Ed.2d 843 (1981) ("no objection is required 
when the prejudice cannot be corrected or when objection would 
exaggerate it")(citing United States v. Young. 463 F.2d 934, 940 
(D.C.Cir. 1972); United States v. Freeman. 514 F.2d 1314, 1319 n. 
34 (D.C.Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds. 598 F.2d 306 
(D.C.Cir. 1979)). This Court itself has recognized that curative 
instructions aren't always effective. Peters. 796 P.2d at 712. 
Accord, State v. Franks. 445 P.2d 200 (Wash. 1968) ; State v. 
Claflin. 690 P.2d 1186 (Wash. App. 1984). 
Not even appellate judges can be so naive as really to 
believe that all twelve jurors succeeded in performing 
what Judge L. Hand aptly called "a mental gymnastic which 
is beyond, not only their powers, but anybody's else." 
Nash v. United States. 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2nd Cir. 
1932) . 
United States v. Bozza. 365 F.2d 206, 215 (2nd Cir. 1966). 
In the context of prosecutorial misconduct in closing 
arguments, Utah should adopt a rule whereby plain error will be 
reviewed on appeal despite a conscious tactical decision not to 
object on the part of defense counsel. Only if prosecutors are 
regularly reversed for their misconduct will they conform their 
conduct to that which is legally and ethically required. 
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[A prosecuting attorney] is the representative not of an 
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty 
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling 
as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, 
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall 
win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he 
is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of 
the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not 
escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with 
earnestness and vigor—indeed, he should do so. But, 
while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to 
strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from 
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful 
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to 
bring about a just one. 
State v. Emmett, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 36 (Utah April 7, 1992) 
(quoting Beraer v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
Appellant is entitled to a fair prosecutor and a fair trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
the conviction of Cory M. Davison and remand for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this $JJL day of December, 1992. 
/ . 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CLARK DONALDSON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
Amendment XIV to the Constitution of the United States, 
as applicable by the fifth amendment, provides: 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States, nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Article I, section 7 of the Constitution of Utah 
provides: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
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